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three statutes, when read together, allow only for gathering and presen-
tation of evidence from those persons determined to be "victims" under
the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act (hereinafter "the Act"). 39 In
reading these statutes in concert, Beck asserted that in limiting the
definition of "victim"in the Act to members of the deceased's family, the
legislature implicitly intended to limit admissible victim impact evi-
dence to that submitted by persons under Code Sections 19.2-264.5 and
19.2-299.1.4
0
The court found no merit to this argument, determining that nothing
within the Act limited the source of victim impact evidence.4 1 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that sections 19.2-299.1 simply defined whose
consent the Commonwealth had to acquire in order to submit the victim
impact statement in the sentencing report. The court concluded that
nothing in the cited code provisions limited the sources of the victim
impact statements and found instead that the presentence report could
include anything the trial court "may require related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim."42 Unfortunately, the court did not stop there,
but went on to determine that "the circumstances of the individual case
will dictate what evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from what
sources it may be drawn. ' 43 Again, the court is establishing a standard,
couched in broad, ambiguous language. At some point, such a standard
becomes counterproductive, sweeping so much that the standard elimi-
nates itself.
Despite the court's rejection, the statutory argument devised by
Beck's counsel is clever and worthy of future pursuit. To strengthen the
argument, capital defense counsel should investigate its legislative
ment required; contents; uses.," the Code provides:
The presentence report prepared pursuant to § 19.2-299 shall,
with the consent of the victim, as defined in § 19.2-11.01, in all cases
involving offenses other than capital murder, include a Victim Impact
Statement. Victim Impact Statements in all cases involving capital
murder shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the provi-
sions of § 19.2-264.5.
A Victim Impact Statement shall be kept confidential and shall be
sealed upon entry of the sentencing order. If prepared by someone other
than the victim, it shall... (vi) provide such other information as the court
may require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.
39 Va. Code §§ 19.2-11.01 to -11.4 (1996).
40 Beck, 253 Va. at 384,484 S.E.2d at 905.
41 1d. at 384, 484 S.E.2d at 905.
42 Id.
43 Id. Again, the court leaves such a determination within the sound
discretion of the trial court subject only to an abuse of discretion standard
on appeal. Id. at 384-85, 484 S.E.2d at 905.
history, to ascertain, if possible, the Act's legislative intent. Further-
more, counsel could argue the principles of in pari materia (statutes
within the same Act should be construed consistently) and strict con-
struction of criminal statutes.
m. The Twists within Beck
In spite of the fact that on the surface this seems to be another
dismaying death penalty opinion handed down by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, some careful "scratching" reveals quite a different conclusion.
The first point of light within the darkness is that a capital defendant with
ajury sentencing hearing may not be subject to the relevance standard of
admissibility of victim impact evidence outlined in Beck. The court's
heavy reliance upon the sound discretion of the trial judge in separating
relevant from prejudicial victim impact evidence is not applicable to jury
sentencing.44 The unique training and experience of the trial judge
which the court assures creates presumptions of fairness and impartiality
is not present with jurors. Consequently, it can be argued that the broad
relevance standard employed in Beck applies only to the trained judicial
sentencer.
The second twist in Beck concerns the letters from family and non-
family members of the victims which contained recommendations that
Beck be sentenced to death, and which were reviewed by the trial judge
as victim impact evidence.45 Based on the record, the court found that
the trial judge separated the permissible victim impact evidence from any
potentially prejudicial statements concerning sentencing and only con-
sidered the former.46 Arguably then, the inference can be drawn that the
judge in his sound discretion must have decided that these recommenda-
tions for death should not be considered. Using this argument, capital
defense counsel can attempt to keep out similar victim impact evidence
which recommends the death penalty.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
44 The court itself, in reviewing the admissibility and consideration
of the victim impact evidence received by the trial court, "[stressed] that
this was a trial without a jury." Beck 253 Va. at 385,484 S.E.2d at 905.
45 The court maintained that it does not necessarily agree with
Beck's characterization of these letters as "recommendations" or that the
trial judge took them as such. Instead, the court views the statements as
expressions of the depth of the authors' feelings concerning the impact
of these crimes. Id. at 386 n.2, 484 S.E.2d at 906 n.2.
46 Beck, 253 Va. at 386, 484 S.E.2d at 906.
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Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
In November 1985, Terry Williams robbed and murdered Harris
Thomas Stone. Williams struck Stone, an elderly man, on the chest and
back with a mattock and removed three dollars from Stone's wallet. The
blows from the mattock fractured several of Stone's ribs, punctured his
left lung, and caused internal bleeding which ultimately led to Stone's
death. Williams confessed to the murder and robbery on several
occasions. 1 In September 1986, Williams was convicted of capital
murder while in the commission of armed robbery pursuant to Virginia
Code Section 18.2-31(d).
2
1 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1997).
2This section has since been changedto Virginia Code Section 18.2-
31(4).
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1 -Page 31
At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence
of Williams' "extensive criminal record. ' 3 Additionally, the Common-
wealth called two forensic psychological experts who testified that there
was a "high probability" that Williams would commit violent acts in the
future.4 The defense presented little mitigation evidence, calling only
Williams' mother, a female acquaintance, and the foster mother of an old
girlfriend. These three witnesses testified that they had never known
Williams to be a violent person. 5 The main mitigation evidence relied on
by the defense was the fact that Williams' confession to the crime was
unsolicited.
6
The jury fixed Williams' punishment at death based on its finding
of the "future dangerousness" aggravator, determining that there was a
probability that Williams "would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society." 7 The conviction
and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia.8 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In August 1988, Williams filed a state habeas corpus petition in the
Danville Circuit Court.10 The court dismissed a number of the habeas
claims following a 1989 hearing. 11 An amended petition was filed in
April 1995. The circuit court heard evidence on the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel in June 1995.12 On July 1, 1995, jurisdiction over
the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to the
amendments to Virginia Code Section 8.01-654.13 The supreme court
subsequently ordered the circuit court to "report its findings of fact and
recommend conclusions of law" regarding the issue of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 14 In June 1996, the circuit court heard oral arguments
on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.15 The circuit court
concluded that trial counsel's failure to present certain mitigating evi-
dence at the sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel and warranted the granting of relief to Williams.
16
3 Williams, 487 S.E.2d at 196.
4 Id.
5Id.
6 Id. at 197.
7 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 195 (1997).
8 Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168,360 S.E.2d 361 (1987).
9 Williams v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
10 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 195 (1997). This was the
same court in which Williams' original trial was conducted.
111d.
12 Id. The judge who conducted the June 1995 evidentiary hearing
on Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was the same judge
who presided at Williams' trial in 1986.
13 Effective July 1, 1995, Virginia Code Section 8.01-654 was
amended to add subsection (c) which states, in part, that the Supreme
Court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" to consider and grant writs of
habeas corpus to convicts sentenced to death.
14 Williams, 487 S.E.2d at 195. Virginia Code Section 8.01-654(c),
as amended, also states that the circuit court "which entered the judgment
order setting the sentence of death shall have authority to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on such petition [for a writ of habeas corpus] only if
directed to do so by order of the Supreme Court."
151d. at 196.
16 Id. The circuit court found that there was a wide variety of
evidence which was worthy of jury consideration in mitigation. For
example, there was evidence that Williams may have had a "deprived and
abused upbringing; that he may have been a neglected and mistreated
child; ... that he was borderline mentally retarded [and] that [his] conduct
had been good in certain structured settings in his life (such as when he
was incarcerated)." Id at 197. Additionally, the court found that there
were "friends, neighbors and family members [other than those presented
during the original sentencing hearing] who would have testified that he
had redeeming qualities."Id. Specifically, the court stated: "Probably the
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the circuit court's
recommendation and refused to grant the writ.17 Specifically, the court
held that (1) "the issue whether a prisoner held under a death sentence is
entitled to habeas relief is a mixed question of law and fact[; tiherefore,
a circuit court's finding and conclusion on the issue are not binding upon
[the supreme court] but is properly the subject ofjudicial review;" 18 and
(2) Williams was not entitled to relief.19
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Standard of Review Under Virginia Code Section 8.01-654 as
Amended
This case presents the first state habeas corpus petition filed since
theJuly 1995 amendment to Virginia Code Section 8.01-654. Therefore,
in addition to addressing the merits of Williams' claims, the supreme
court set forth the standards of review which it would apply to the circuit
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court's holding on
this issue is troubling at best.
First, the court's interpretation of Virginia Code Section 8.01-654
requiring it to give little, if any, weight to the trial court's findings of fact
and recommended conclusions of law represents both a waste ofjudicial
resources and a departure from the deference traditionally paid to the
decisions of the trial judge. The trial judge is in the best position to
determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of
the trial would have been different but for counsel's errors. In this case,
however, the supreme court treated the circuit court's findings as a mere
collection of data. It drew its own conclusions from the evidence and
determined that Williams was not prejudiced by the near total failure of
counsel to present mitigating evidence. Further, the court seemed to find
that as a matter of law Williams was not prejudiced by counsel's
deficiencies.
In order to support its decision that the circuit court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law were due no deference by the supreme court,
the court looked to The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott20 and Kimmelman v.
Morrison.21 Both of these cases are distinguishable and present fairly
weak support. The Stenrich Group dealt with whether a determination
of the Workers Compensation Commission on a mixed question of law
and factwas binding on the supreme court. Thefactualpartofthemixed
question was whether the claimants suffered impairments. The legal part
of the mixed question was whether those impairments "constitute
disease within the contemplation of the [Worker's Compensation]
Act."22 Although the court held that the commission's determination
was notbinding on it, arguably this was because the issue was one of pure
most persuasive mitigating evidence which was not tendered to the jury
involved the failure [of trial counsel) to interview and call Bruce Elliott
as a witness during the sentencing phase." Id. Elliott was a certified
public accountant and actually contacted defense counsel prior to
Williams' trial and offered to testify, however, counsel never acted upon
this offer. Id. Although Elliott did not testify at the habeas hearing, he
stated in an affidavit that he had known Williams since 1978; that
Williams was "a decent human being who struggled to prove his worth
in spite of his being somewhat disadvantaged mentally, emotionally, and
financially;" and that Williams "took pride in his achievements" such as
graduating from carpentry school while incarcerated. Id.
17 Williams, 487 S.E.2d at 200.
18 Id. at 198.
19 Id. at 200.
20251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996).
21477 U.S. 365 (1986).
22 The Stenrich Group, 251 Va. at 192,467 S.E.2d at 798.
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statutory interpretation. Whether or not an injury was covered by a
worker's compensation statute is vastly differentthan whether a "reason-
able probability" exists that presentation of mitigation evidence would
have changed the outcome of Williams' sentencing hearing. The former
did not require the observation of witnesses or the weighing of the
evidence, while the latter unquestionably did. Consequently, in the latter
case, the judgment of the circuit court judge, the only judicial actor with
the opportunity to make such observations, should have been granted
significant, if not dispositive, weight.
The second case relied upon by the court, Kimmelman,was cited for
the proposition that "a state court's ultimate conclusions regarding
competence and prejudice are not findings of fact binding on the federal
court."23 This statement, however, was taken out of context. In this
portion of Kimmelman, the Supreme Court considered the weight which
should be given to the judge's statementregarding the validity ofaFourth
Amendment objection which counsel failed to make in a timely manner.
The judge's statement was made during a post trial bail hearing; it was
neither a ruling on the objection nor a finding or conclusion. The portion
of the opinion which the Supreme Court of Virginia quoted in Williams
stated, basically, that the statement made by the judge, under the
particular facts of Kimmelman, was not entitled to a presumption of
correctness under Title 28 United States Code Section 2254(d). 24
Kimmelman simply did not involve the weight which should be given to
a circuit court's findings regarding an issue on which it has heard
evidence and made findings and conclusions at the direction of the
supreme court. As such, the Court's holding in Kimmelman is inappli-
cable in the present case.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As set forth by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Williams, an
accused "is entitled to counsel who is a reasonably competent attorney
and to advice that is within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases."'25 In a collateral attack on a conviction,
however, the United States Supreme Court has held that an "error by
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
the judgment."'26 Thus, a prisoner asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel in a habeas proceeding must show (1) deficient performance by
counsel and (2) prejudice. 27 In order to show prejudice under Strickland
v. Washington,28 a prisoner must show "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 29
Although the Strickland test, as set forth above, has been the
standard applied to ineffective assistance cases for more than a decade,
the Supreme Court of Virginia has, in the present case, significantly
increased the burden on petitioner and significantly restricted the guar-
antees of the Sixth Amendment. As the court stated, "an analysis
focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to
whether the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is
defective." 30 In so holding, the court reasoned that "to set aside a
conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been
23 Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 388-389.
24 Id.
25 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194,198 (1997) (citingStrickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
26 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
27 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
28466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29 Id. at 694.
30 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 198 (1997) (quoting
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)).
different but for counsel's error may grant a defendant a windfall to
which the law does not entitle him."3 1 The court cited Lockhart v.
FretweI132 as support for this proposition. This standard implies that
even if defense counsel was deficient and "but for" his deficiencies there
was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different,
the petitioner is still not entitled to a new trial. By imposing this added
consideration, the court effectively eliminates the "reasonable probabil-
ity" language of Strickland. In so doing, the court makes it nearly
impossible for a prisoner to carry his burden of showing prejudice.
Additionally, the court's reasoning represents a serious misreading
of Lockhart v. Fretwell. In Lockhart, the United States Supreme Court
dealt with a very unusual situation. The narrow holding in Lockhart was
that "counsel's failure to make an objection in a state criminal sentencing
proceeding- an objection that would have been supported by a decision
which subsequently was overruled - [did not] constitute 'prejudice'
within the meaning of' Strickland.33 The Court reiterated repeatedly
that the "touchstone of an ineffective assistance claim is the fairness of
the adversary proceeding." 34 As such, the Court did in fact state that "an
analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without atten-
tion to whether the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable,
is defective." 35
The Court went on to explain, however, that "[u]nreliability or
unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not
deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to
which the law entitles him."'36 Because the grounds for the objection
which counsel in Lockhart failed to make at the sentencing hearing was
subsequently overruled, the accused was not entitled to the objection and
"therefore suffered no prejudice from his counsel's deficient perfor-
mance." 37 TheLockhartCourtreliedonits decision inNixv. Whiteside,
3 8
where the respondent argued that he received ineffective assistance
because his counsel refused to cooperate in presenting perjured testi-
mony, to further illustrate this point. In Nix, the Court stated that sheer
outcome determination "was not sufficient to make out a case" for
ineffective assistance because there is no right to present perjured
testimony regardless of the effect it may have had on the outcome of the
trial.39
Both Lockhart and Nix represent unusual circumstances wherein
"the defendant attempts to demonstrate prejudice based on consider-
ations that, as a matter of law, ought not to inform the inquiry." 40 The
rights that the prisoners in each of those cases asserted were "right[s] the
law simply does not recognize." 41 This, however, was not the case in
Williams. The right which Williams was denied due to counsel's
ineffectiveness was the right to present mitigating evidence. Unlike the
31 Id. (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,369-70 (1993)).
32506 U.S. 364 (1993).
33 Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 366.
34 1d. at 370.
35 Id. at 369.
361d. at 372 (emphasis added).
37 Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372.
38 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
39 Nix, 475 U.S. at 175.
40 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 373 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor was also careful to point out that"today's
decision will, in the vastmajority of cases, have no effect on the prejudice
inquiry under Strickland."Id. Further, she stated that the "determinative
question - whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different - remains unchanged." Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
411d. at370 (quotingNixv. Whiteside, supra,475 U.S. 157,186-187
(1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
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rights at issue in both Lockhart and Nix, the right to present mitigating
evidence at trial is recognized by the law.42 Williams was entitled to
present such evidence. Thus, Lockhart i8 readily distinguishable from
the situation in Williams and the supreme court's reliance on it was badly
misplaced.
In short, the Supreme Court of Virginia has attempted to take
what was intended by the U.S. Supreme Court to be an infrequently used
addition to the Strickland test and made it generally applicable to all
ineffective assistance claims in Virginia. In so doing the court has made
it even more difficult for a prisoner to carry the burden on an ineffective
assistance claim and receive relief even where "there [was] a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."43
42 Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(b) (1983).
43 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
This case, if nothing else, illustrates the importance of present-
ing all the mitigating evidence that is available during the sentencing
hearing. The circuit court in Williams put it very succinctly: "at a capital
murder sentencing, any evidence which might be favorable or mitigating
can mean the difference between 'life or death."' 44 Following the
decision in Williams, it is more important than ever that counsel presents
an effective case during both the guilt and sentencing phases including
all available mitigating evidence.
Summary and Analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke
44 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1997).
GREAT MYTHS: SANTA CLAUS, THE EASTER BUNNY &
VIRGINIA'S PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
BY: DEBORAH A. HILL
I. Introduction
Under Virginia Code Section 17-110.1(C) (2) the Supreme Court of
Virginia is required to determine whether a sentence of death in a given
case is disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases. Despite
this statutory requirement, the Supreme Court of Virginiais not conduct-
ing adequate proportionality review. Consequently, the defendant is
denied a state created right in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Additionally, the lax treatment of proportionality
review in Virginia violates the constitutional requirement of meaningful
appellate review.
The pathetic state of proportionality review in Virginia may be
analyzed at three levels. First, under existing Supreme Court precedent,
an argument exists that although proportionality review is not constitu-
tionally required, meaningful appellate review is required. Therefore,
the inadequate proportionality review conducted by the Supreme Court
of Virginia, in combination with its weak application of other statutory
provisions in Virginia Code Section 17-110.1, renders appellate review
meaningless and, therefore, unconstitutional.
The second part of this article analyzes proportionality review
under Virginia case law. Here, the emphasis is on the skewed standard
that results from the limited universe of cases the court is willing to
consider. Case law also suggests that the court'is not following the
procedures set forth in Virginia Code Section 17-110.1. Theresultofthis
is a denial of a state created right to proportionality review.
Finally, in the last section, the article compares Virginia's propor-
tionality review process with other states that engage in more thorough
review procedures.
II Proportionality Review Before Pulley v. Harris
The language of Furman v. Georgia' suggests that some form of
meaningful appellate review is necessary to guard against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. When the Supreme Court reinstated the
death penalty in 1976, it did so, in part, because meaningful appellate
1408 U.S. 238 (1972).
review was included in the death penalty statutes before the Court. Thus,
the standard evolved from Furman that to pass constitutional muster,
meaningful appellate review must be part of a state's death penalty
statute. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that
proportionality review is not a constitutionally necessary element of
meaningful appellate review.
2
A. Meaningful Appellate Review
In Furman, the United States Supreme Court declared existing
death penalty statutes unconstitutional. It held that the death penalty
could not be imposed under sentencing schemes that created a substantial
risk that death would be inflicted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The concern for proportional sentencing was expressed by Justice
Douglas inhis concurrencetoFurman. He stated that '[t]he high service
rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see
to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily
to unpopular groups."'
3
Four years later, the Supreme Court found that the death penalty
schemes in Georgia, Florida, and Texas satisfied Furman. Part of the
Court's justification for approving the sentencing schemes in these three
states was the inclusion of meaningful appellate review in their death
penalty statutes.
In Gregg v. Georgia,4 the United States Supreme Court held that
Georgia's death penalty scheme was constitutional, in part, because it
required that the Georgia Supreme Court review each sentence of death
and determine whether the sentence of death was proportional to those
sentences imposed in similar cases.5 The Court wrote:
2 pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
3 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
4428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
